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Abstract
Where a Florida resident incurs injuries as a result of tortious conduct
perpetrated by another Florida resident in a foreign state, and an action
to recover for the injuries is subsequently initiated in Florida,
should the law of the place of the wrong1 govern the substantive rights
and liabilities of the parties concerned?
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Where a Florida resident incurs injuries as a result of tortious conduct
perpetrated by another Florida resident in a foreign state, and an ac-
tion to recover for the injuries is subsequently initiated in Florida,
should the law of the place of the wrong1 govern the substantive rights
and liabilities of the parties concerned? Prior to the decision rendered
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint
Co.,2 state courts were mandated to adhere to the doctrine of lex loci
delicti and apply the law of the place of the wrong irrespective of any
other factors. 3 In Bishop, guest passengers in an aircraft were injured
when the aircraft, en route from Jacksonville, Florida to North Caro-
lina, experienced engine difficulties and crashed in South Carolina. The
trial court, applying the doctrine of lex loci delicti, granted a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the law of
South Carolina4 governing the standard of care imposed on a pilot and
an owner of an airplane should be the controlling guideline rather than
the law of Florida. 5 Whereas Florida law merely required a showing of
1. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
2. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980), answering the certified question issued by the
First District Court of Appeal in 377 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
3. Olsen v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 1980 Fla. L. Weekly 1509 (5th Dist. Ct.
App. Aug. 8, 1980); Ganem v. Ganem de Issa, 269 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973); Tom v. Messinger, 235 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Lescard v. Keel, 211 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 401 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968); Astor Elec. Serv. v.
Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1952).
4. S.C. CODE § 55-1-10 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No person transported by the owner or the operator of an aircraft as his guest
without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for dam-
ages against such aircraft, its owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case
of accident unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such
owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or reckless disregard of the
rights of others.
5. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1940), the Florida guest statute, was repealed by ch. 72-
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ordinary negligence, South Carolina law required a showing of either
"heedless or reckless disregard of the rights" of others or that the acci-
dent was intentional. Plaintiffs conceded they could not satisfy the bur-
den imposed by South .Carolina law.
On appeal, plaintiffs, relying on Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation,7  argued that a modern approach to choice-of-law
problems in tort actions should be adopted by the court. They advo-
cated the adoption of the "most significant relationship" approach. 8
Upon affirming the trial court's decision, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, articulated:
Despite the uncertainties created by the court's action in Hopkins of first
receding from the lex loci delicti rule (by a vote of 4 to 3) and then, on
rehearing granted, reversing its original opinion (by a vote of 4 to 3), we
conclude that the net effect of the decision was to leave in the rule as
1, 1972 Fla. Laws 113. Consequently, a host may be sued by his guest for ordinary
negligence. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 377 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
6. S.C. CODE § 55-1-10 (1976).
7. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967). In Hopkins, the plaintiff urged the Supreme
Court of Florida to adopt a modern approach to choice-of-law problems. The Court
agreed with the plaintiff, but on rehearing, it reversed its decision stating that it was
not yet time to recede from the doctrine of lex loci delicti given the objectivity with
which the doctrine could be applied. Id. at 752.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). Section 145
reads as follows:
§ 145. The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
2
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previously established and generally followed by the Florida courts.9
The district court, in light of the "great public interest"10 attached to
the issue, then certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the following
question:
Does the lex loci delicti rule govern the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties in tort actions, precluding consideration by Florida courts of other
relevant considerations, such as the policies and purposes underlying the
conflicting laws of a-foreign jurisdiction where the tort occurred, and the
relationship of the occurrence and of the parties to such policies and
purposes?11
As previously indicated, the Supreme Court of Florida responded
to the certified question in the negative. The Court acknowledged the
"consistency and stability [promoted] by [the] application of a stable
and objective standard [i.e., the doctrine of lex loci delicti] for choice-
of-law determinations.1 12 However, it also stated that there were sev-
eral factors in the Bishop case which disclosed the need for and
prompted the Court to adopt a more flexible rule. The Court noted:
In the present case, for instance, the weekend trip was to begin and end
in Florida, plaintiffs and defendants are all Florida residents, and the
host-guest relationship between the parties arose in Florida. The rela-
tionship of South Carolina to the personal injury action is limited to the
happenstance of the plane coming into contact with South Carolina soil
after developing engine trouble in unidentified airspace. 13
In light of these tactors, the Court announced that the time had
arrived for a choice-of-law rule which would encompass factors of this
nature. It therefore proclaimed the adoption of the "most significant
relationship" approach.
To evaluate and fully comprehend the impact that the Bishop case
will have upon future litigation, one needs to analyze the roots, criti-
9. 377 So. 2d at 768.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
13. Id.
15:1981 301 1Demise of Lex Loci Delicti
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cisms and applications of the two concepts - the doctrine of lex loci
delicti and the '"most significant relationship" approach. This comment
initially seeks to trace the birth of the traditional rule and to elaborate
upon the factors which justified its original popularity as well as those
which ultimately provoked its demise. Thereafter, it examines the mod-
ern approach to ascertain whether it will rectify the problems encoun-
tered under the traditional rule.
THE DOCTRINE OF LEX Loci DELICTI
The doctrine of lex loci delicti was conceived as early as the mid-
nineteenth century.1 4 It emanated from the "vested rights"15 theory
which dictated that "a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its crea-
tion to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and de-
pends for its existence and extent solely on such law."1 , Its chief propo-
nent was Professor Joseph H. Beale.17 Courts and legal scholars have
articulated numerous and varied justifications for the doctrine. In First
National Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek,16 the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado justified the doctrine on the basis that "[in the mid-nineteenth
century, conditions were such that people only occasionally crossed
state boundaries. Under those circumstances, there was legitimacy in a
rule which presumed that persons changing jurisdictions would be
aware of the different duties and obligations they were incurring when
they made the interstate journey."19 In Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation,0 the Supreme Court of Florida was impressed by the
doctrine's objectivity, consistency and stability. The Court stated that
"[t]here are obvious virtues, in consistency and stability, supporting the
application of laws whenever possible in a cohesive rather than piece-
14. First Nat'l Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314, 316
(1973).
15. For a treatment of this theory, see Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict
of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1945).
16. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
17. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 L. & CONTEMP.
PROn. 679, 679 (1963).
18. 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314.
19. Id. at -, 514 P.2d at 316.
20. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
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meal fashion. In other words, the applicability or inapplicability of for-
eign law should so far as possible be based on objective and stable stan-
dards.' It has also been suggested by William Reese, one of the
Reporters of the Restatement (Second), that the doctrine was justified
by man's proclivity to make things as easy as possible:
For it is in the nature of men to seek certainty and simplicity in the law.
They will wish to regulate a field by a few simple rules if rules of this
nature can be devised to handle adequately the problems involved. And
if a few simple rules will handle all, or at least the great majority, of
problems that have arisen in a great field, men will be tempted to believe
that the same rules can satisfactorily be applied to handle all other
problems with which they may thereafter be faced.22
Finally, supporters of the doctrine emphasized the expediency, uni-
formity, certainty and predictability23 which the doctrine promoted.
24
As society grew increasingly mobile, and even before Professor
Beale had completed his task of embodying the doctrine of lex loci
delicti into the first Restatement, the doctrine was subjected to strict
scrutiny by legal scholars in the field.25 The criticism proved warranted.
While application of the doctrine appeared to pose no inequities to sin-
21. Id. at 752.
22. Reese, supra note 17, at 680.
23. But see Reese, supra note 17, at 681. Reese contends that "rules cannot
bring certainty and predictability to a subject in which these values do not exist. Of
necessity, many conflicts rules must be fluid in operation and leave much to be worked
out by the courts." On another occasion, Reese expanded upon his criticism of the
traditional rule:
In retrospect, it seems clear that rules of this sort, at best in areas of contract
and torts, could not prove successful. There are many different kinds of contracts
and torts. The number of issues that can arise in these two areas of law and the
variety of ways that relevant contacts can be grouped among the interested states
border on the infinite. Certainly it would be miraculous if all issues could be
satisfactorily decided by application of the law of the place of [the wrong].
Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1252 (1963).
24. See Note, A Suggested Method for the Resolution of Tort Choice-of-Law
Problems in Place-of-the-Wrong Rule Jurisdictions, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. R. 430, 469
(1973).
25. See, e.g., Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
23 YALE L. J. 736 (1924).
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gle state torts, the perfunctory application of the doctrine to cases
where several states, especially the forum state, were significantly re-
lated to the occurrence proved problematic and frequently produced
harsh results.26To circumvent these unjust decisions, and frequently to
invoke their own state laws, courts began to employ "manipulative de-
vices"'2 7 including characterization,28 public policy,2 9 and renvoi.3 ° As
26. See Note, supra note 24, at 464-65, analyzing Tom v. Messinger, 203 So. 2d
357 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In Messinger, two Florida residents, who had em-
barked on a round-trip journey to Washington, D.C., were killed when their automobile
collided with a bridge abutment in North Carolina. The passenger's minor child
brought a wrongful death suit under sections 768.01 and 768.02, Florida Statutes,
against the driver's estate. The suit was subsequently dismissed with prejudice when
the court concluded that North Carolina law governed, precluding suit by individuals
other than the representative of a decedent's estate. Acknowledging that the decedents
were both residents of Florida, that the guest-host relationship originated in Florida,
that the journey was commenced and terminated in Florida, the court articulated that
nevertheless it had an inviolable duty to adhere to the doctrine of lex loci delicti. The
inequity manifested itself in the court's refusal to consider these factors and the fact
that North Carolina had no interest in applying its law. The policy behind its law -
distribution of recovery through the law of descent and distribution - would not have
been advanced by the interjection of North Carolina law into an action involving Flor-
ida residents and Florida property.
27. See Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: A Time to Go Modern, 24 WAYNE
L. REv. 829, 839-47 (1978); Leflar, The Torts Provisions of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), 72 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 271-74 (1972); LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
212-18 (1968).
28. See Leflar, supra note 27, at 212, 215. Leflar criticizes characterization, but
acknowledges its virtues.
It is an essential early step in almost any legal analysis, but the step is one that
can serve the purposes of the legal artist as well as the legal logician. If more
than one characterization is logically available on a set of facts and permissible,
the choice between the characterizations may turn on a judicial desire to achieve
justice in the particular case, on a public policy preference for one rule of law
over another, on a preference for the forum state's own law or on something else
other than pure logic.
Id. at 212.
[I]t is an elementary aspect of legal reasoning. But it should not be made to
perform functions beyond its own purpose, which is classificatory only. Charac-
terization is a proper initial step in any legal problem, including choice-of-law
problems. If more than one traditional characterization is available on a given set
of facts, all possible characterizations should be identified and brought into the
open. Not until this is done is it possible to see what proper choice influencing
1 304 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
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the courts' propensity to employ these devices increased, the once advo-
cated virtues of the doctrine of lex loci delicti became progressively
illusory. This judicial propensity to escape the strict application of the
doctrine indicated that with the "horse and buggy days"3' gone, the
time had ripened for the adoption of new choice-of-law theories which
would embrace considerations of policy, fairness and other relevant
factors.32
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH
In 1963, a response to the overwhelming dissatisfaction with and
the harshness of the doctrine of lex loci delicti was articulated by the
New York Court of Appeals. In Babcock v. Jackson,3 3 that court pro-
claimed its abandonment of the doctrine and its adoption of the most
significant relationship approach posited in the Restatement (Second)."
Elaborating upon his theory selection, Judge Fuld declared:
Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" ... may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which,
because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties,
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.
considerations are relevant in the case.
Id. at 215.
29. The public policy manipulative device was employed when a forum deemed
the law of the jurisdiction whose law was to govern to be "shocking." See Sedler, supra
note 27, at 841 (1978). According to Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918), a law was deemed "shocking" if enforce-
ment thereof would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent con-
ception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of common weal." Sedler, supra
note 27, at 841 n.68. It is demonstrated in Gillen v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 301
So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1974) and Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla.
1967) that Florida courts do subscribe to the use of this device.
30. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). In Richards, the
Court, by employing the renvoi device, ruled that a federal district court was obligated
to apply not only the internal law of the state where the negligent act or omission
transpired, but the whole law, including the choice of law rules of the state.
31. Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Dev. Corp., 396 F.2d 917, 922
(5th Cir. 1968).
32. See 377 So. 2d at 768.
33. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
34. REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
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The merit of such a rule is that "it gives to the place 'having the most
interest in the problem' paramount control over the legal issues arising
out of a particular factual context. . . ." 35
Since Judge Fuld rendered his decision in Babcock, numerous states,
Florida now among them, have adopted one of several modern ap-
proaches to conflicts-of-law problems.3"
As applied, the most significant relationship approach entails a
two-prong test. Failure to respect either prong will only be counter-
productive.37 It is imperative that those variables listed under Section
14538 of the Restatement (Second) be examined in light of the vari-
35. 191 N.E.2d at 283.
36. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have already rejected the
place of the injury rule and adopted one of several modern approaches. Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447
P.2d 254 (1968); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453
(1977); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 550, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); First
Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d
42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Arnett v.
Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309
(La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371
Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d
408 (1973); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439
S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk v.
Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D.
1972); Brickner v. Goodin, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson Constr. &
Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa.
1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Gutberrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979);
Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Gaither v. Meyers, 404 F.2d 216
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
37. See Leflar, supra note 27, at 269.
38. The variables listed under Section 145 include:
(a) the place of the injury,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of busi-
ness of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
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ables enumerated under Section 639 of the Restatement (Second). It
was from these factors that the approach derived its flexibility and
earned judicial respect and recognition. This flexibility permitted courts
to eliminate "false conflicts,' 40 minimize the use of manipulative de-
vices4' and determine the applicable law on an issue by issue basis.42
Irrespective of the obvious attributes of the new approach as com-
pared with the doctrine of lex loci delicti, critics have revealed that the
most significant relationship is not the anticipated conflicts panacea, for
its viability is threatened by a few inherent infirmities. It has been sug-
gested that the language of Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement
(Second) is rather indeterminate and without direction.'3 Interpretation
of terminology is left to the discretion or "idiosyncratic analysis" 44 of
courts. This discretion militates against the choice-of-law policies of
predictability of result and uniformity of application.' 5 Moreover,
39. Section 6 provides for consideration of the following factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law.
Id.
For a discussion of these factors, see Reese, supra note 17, at 682-91.
40. For a discussion on false conflicts, see Note, supra note 24, at 464 n.7.
41. See Leflar, supra note 27, at 272-73.
42. Id. at 273; Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84. In other words, it is
conceivable that in a single case, one state's law may govern with respect to one issue
and another state's law may govern with respect to another issue. In contrast, the doc-
trine of lex loci delicti appeared omnipotent. Leflar states:
[The doctrine] covered all such aspects of the act and injury in question as the
state of mind with which the act was done, the motive if any, the surrounding
circumstances tending to indicate negligence or non-negligence, including con-
tributory negligence, privilege or other legal justification for the act, its causal
connection with produced results . . . and all other matters inherent in the act
and injury which go to determine their legal characteristics.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcrs LAW 317 (1968).
43. See Note, supra note 24, at 472.
44. Leflar, supra note 37, at 273.
45. See 514 P.2d at 318.
5:1981
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courts may be prone to construing the variables in a self-serving, as
opposed to neutral, fashion."
Critics also warn that the absence in the Restatement (Second) of
any direction as to the relative weight to be accorded to the variables of
Sections 6 and 145 will have adverse consequences. 4 They point out
that although the approach requires that the variables be qualitatively,
not quantitatively, 48 weighed, the absence of any direction allows the
courts, on a carte blanche basis, to subjectively assign greater signifi-
cance to one factor than to another.49 They predict that the ultimate
result of this exercise of judicial subjectivity will be a return to the
doctrine of lex loci delicti. Courts will be forced to place a premium on
the first consideration of Section 145, to wit, the place of the wrong!50
Finally, the critics warn the legal community that this complex
approach cannot be applied in a simplistic manner. They advise the
community that the approach should not be transformed into a mecha-
nism by which the factual contacts of each state involved are counted
and the law of the state with the greatest number of contacts be held
applicable.51
CONCLUSION
By exposing the infirmities of both the doctrine adhered to in the
past and the newly adopted approach, it is hoped that this comment
has defined the boundaries within which the Florida courts should ven-
ture in order to achieve the justice and fairness sacrificed in the past.
At this point, Florida courts enter into a transitional period during
46. See Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1212, 1244 (1963).
47. See, Note, "Rules" v. "Approaches". Choosing A Choice-Of-Law Principle
For Colorado: First National Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 46 U. COLO. L. REV.
107, 121-2 (1974).
48. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 221 (1968).
49. See Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212,
1248 (1963).
50. See Reese, supra note 17, at 704. Reese states that "again we are entangled
in the circular reasoning which refers us to the law under which the 'cause of action' is
alleged to have vested, and again the place of wrong, so often fortuitous, assumes its
predominant importance." Id. at 704.
51. LEFLAR, supra note 48, at 330.
1 308 5:1981 1Nova Law Journal
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/10
5:1981 Demise of Lex Loci Delicti 309 1
which they will learn to implement the requirements of this newly
adopted approach and learn from the experiences of sister courts in
other states who adopted the approach long ago.
Deborah Ohman-Zimet
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